RSSPCW/InfoWorld Loses Respect Because of Roger A Grimes
Feb 13
China, rants and raves China, imposters, posers, rants No Comments
I just read an article by Roger A. Grimes entitled, Is the Chinese Government Really Behind Cyberattacks?: Circumstantial evidence alone should not condemn Beijing of sponsoring hacking of U.S. companies. From the subtitle I was interested in what angle this guy was going to take, so i read on … only to be sadly disappointed in identifying yet another poser.
In his article, Roger states that “the first public allegation of Chinese military hacking was back in 2005 with the Titan Rain project.” This was where I realized this guy was an imposter. The weird thing about this claim of 2005 being the first public allegations against the Chinese military is that Roger later mentions the plethora of results when searching for hacking originating from China. Perhaps he did not read the results, or maybe he was just lazy and stopped after finding something from 2005?
If you want some allegations, ask Taiwan. Or ask the United States Congress about Taiwan and China. Here is a wonderful excerpt from the statement made by Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, Ph.D.Associate Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia, at the “Hearing on Military Modernization and Cross-Strait Balance,” before the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second Session, February 6, 2004.
[ http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2004hearings/transcripts/04_02_06.pdf ]
In recent years some well-versed military theorists and writers in the PLA have been exploring new concepts of war that call into question, if not invalidate, these two dictums. Of particular note is their fascination with asymmetric warfare strategies that make offense a more attractive option to the weaker party. One publication that has attracted considerable attention inside and outside China is Unrestricted Warfare. Reflecting upon war in the age of technological integration and globalization, the authors discuss a new type of war—unrestricted warfare (chaoxian zhan)— that transcends all boundaries and limits, and promote expanding combat beyond the battlefield to include such other facets as computer warfare, international terrorism, biological and chemical warfare, and economic and financial warfare (caveat: some of their recommendations, such as state-sponsored terrorism, are fundamentally at odds with China’s stated policy).
IW exemplifies unrestricted warfare and lends credence to the concept of asymmetric war. It challenges the conventional Clausewitzian view that ‘‘violence is the essence of war’’ by luring the initiators of IW into thinking that they can achievetheir political objectives without much sacrifice. The Chinese view IW as a superior choice for attaining classic strategist Sun Tzu’s adage: ‘‘To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.’’ It also gives developing nations like China an allure to compensate for their military inferiority vis-a`-vis the United States, because they can make up technological backwardness with superior strategies—the notion of overcoming the superior with the inferior. The Chinese also hope to exploit the apparent paradox that the strong American ‘‘information society’’ also poses a potentially weak side to a determined adversary to achieve Sun Tzu’s highest stage of ‘‘winning the war without fighting.’’ China’s approach toward IW thus fits a pattern that is emblematic of many of its previous reform endeavors—‘‘to retain Chinese teaching as the root and only use Western teaching selectively’’ (Zhongxue weiti, Xixue weiyong). China is developing ‘‘information warfare with Chinese characteristics’’ by integrating traditional Chinese stratagems into modern IW. This strategyposes a challenge to the Western-dominated IW paradigm.
The July 2002 Pentagon report to Congress states that China ‘‘views information operations/information warfare (IO/IW) as a strategic weapon . . .’’ and ‘‘is particularly sensitive to the potential asymmetric applications IO/IW can have in any future conflict with a technologically superior adversary.’’ It points out that China’s military is developing strategies and tactics to use ‘‘surprise, deception, and shock’’ in any opening military campaign, while ‘‘exploring coercive strategies’’ designed to bring Taiwan to terms quickly.
The strategic considerations of China’s interest in unconventional forms of warfare (and devotion to IW in particular) could introduce instability into the Taiwan Strait. Since the end of the Cold War, China’s double-digit growth rate in the 1990s have allowed China to substantially increase its military spending and to use itsnew wealth to acquire advanced weapons and technologies. The PLA is following Deng’s advice to develop ‘‘selective pockets of excellence.’’ Consequently, IW is playing a very important role in this strategic view of military modernization.
As an example of retooling, China has now given its vast 1.5 million-strong reserve force, which in the past was charged with supporting PLA forces in defense against any foreign intervention, with an IW/IO mission. To answer Jiang Zemin’s1991 call for building common telecom systems for both military and civilian use, China has attempted to implement a ‘‘people’s war’’ with IW reserve force.
The advent of IW has introduced a new element into the cross-Strait military situation by presenting China with a potentially credible military option vis-a`-vis Taiwan.
The Pentagon report states that despite Beijing’s professed commitment to apeaceful unification with Taiwan, the Chinese leadership has shown an increasing willingness to consider the use of force to achieve unification. The report argues ‘‘Beijing’s primary political objective in any Taiwan-related crisis . . . likely would be to compel Taiwan authorities to enter into negotiations on Beijing’s terms and to undertake operations with enough rapidity to preclude third-party intervention.’’ It also seems to concur with the view of some analysts that the PLA’s offensive capabilities improve as each year passes, providing Beijing with an increasing number of credible options to intimidate or actually attack Taiwan. With the exception of ballistic missiles, IW seems the most promising option for achieving Beijing’s political objectives. Indeed, the PRC has made considerable efforts toward making IW a real option.
Certain PLA officers have promoted IW as an effective weapon to subdue Taiwan and to deter possible American intervention. Military publications study the various forms IW can be waged in a combined amphibious battle (e.g., command and control war, intelligence war, network war, communication war, and electronic war).
Further, the Chinese military has begun to put these ideas into practice. In the summer of 2001, the PLA for first time began the war game exercises in the Taiwan Strait with information warfare aimed at electronically paralyzing enemy communications and command systems. Also for the first time, a new electronic warfare unit was deployed over the Strait. In exercises the following year, the PLA incorporated even more sophisticated items of IO/IW.
In sum, the PLA seeks to gain information domination in any conflict with Taiwan by attacking Taiwan’s information networks and command and control centers, as well as by conducting propaganda and political warfare. The purpose is to incorporate Taiwan by ‘‘subduing the enemy without actually fighting’’ a` la Sun Tzu, and by denying possible American military intervention.
This trend presents a new challenge to Taiwan and U.S. defense officials. Most analysts have hitherto: (1) dismissed Chinese invasion threat due to the high threshold for success (due to logistical difficulties, Taiwanese resistance, and international intervention); (2) argued that Taiwan’s smaller military can maintain a qualitative edge until at least 2005; (3) questioned whether Beijing has realisticmilitary options vis-a`-vis Taiwan despite both the PRC’s consistent refusal to renounce the use of force and occasional saber-rattling against Taiwan; and (4) held that a probable, albeit not guaranteed, U.S. military intervention (in the case of an unprovoked attack on Taiwan) serves to deter Beijing—i.e., the so-called policy of strategic ambiguity.
From the Chinese standpoint, IW seems to have lowered the threshold for a likely successful military campaign against Taiwan and increased the utility of an offensive strategy. IW seems to hold promise for ‘‘winning the battle without fighting’’ (Sun Tzu’s adage) and ‘‘overcoming the superior with the inferior’’ (Mao’s guerrilla strategy). Properly executed IW may—along with such other coercive weapons as missile strikes and a naval blockade—help bring Taiwan to its knees and deny American intervention. Such perceptions may cloud decision-making and make China more likely to use force. The application of information technology in international conflicts such as cross-Strait tensions may thus result in more instability.
How seriously should American decision-makers take the PRC’s IW endeavors? There is no question that the Chinese military is keenly interested in studying IW. At the present moment the PLA’s interest is primarily academic; its IW capabilities are far from operational (weaponized). The modernization of the Chinese armed forces has so far lagged behind doctrinal development.
Nevertheless, China’s IW forays will benefit from two factors—one old and one new. Historically, China has more than once surprised Western analysts by indigenously developing weapons systems that the West tried hard to deny to China (e.g., atomic bombs in 1964 and nuclear warhead miniaturization technology in 1999). Prudence thus cautions against dismissing the possibility that China may succeed in developing ‘‘IW with Chinese characteristics.’’ Whether a modern IW doctrineguided by proven historical stratagems will surpass the Western model remains to be seen, however.
Most importantly, the future of China’s IW development hinges on the country’s economic ascendancy in general and its rise as a major global IT player in particular. Thanks in large measure to investments by Taiwanese IT firms on the mainland, the PRC has recently overtaken Taiwan as the world’s third largest IT hardware producer and is poised to overtake Japan in the next decade if current growth trends continue. In addition, China’s online population is experiencing exponential growth: from 200,000 in 1997, to 16.9 million in July 2000, and to 45.8 million in July 2002, making China one of the largest and fastest-growing Internet markets. However, viewed from another indicator—Internet penetration rate (i.e., online population as a percentage of total population), China remains sparsely wired. As of July 2002, only 3.58 percent of its population was online, up from 0.001 percent six years ago. Compared to the United States, Japan, and even Taiwan, China clearly has a long way to go before it can claim to be a true information power.
China’s mixed record as an IT society in an increasingly globalized economy—i.e., being a giant in absolute terms and with tremendous upside potential, while also being a dwarf in relative terms—will affect the degree of success of China’s further inroads in IW. The PLA’s immersion in both IW and RMA, notwithstanding, it is hard to imagine a superb IW fighting force detached from a society characterized by relatively low technology and connectivity. A strong IT base gives rise to a strong IW capability.
If you can read that excerpt and still believe allegations against China first came out in 2005, then your sanity and intellectual prowess should be questioned.
As a side note, reading statements like the one above made by Vincent Wei-cheng Wang are both frightening and inspirational. God bless America.
Beyond this hearing by the United States Congress, there are some very interesting reads available from the RAND Corporation.
As to finger pointing, this is how it works … one group has something done to them so they look at the evidence and those around them and begin to point their fingers. There are different ways to point one’s fingers. When the group is trying to figure out who-done-it, they might point their fingers in several directions. As the group is narrowing down the suspects, the finger pointing becomes more confident and possibly open. Eventually, the finger(s) will point at one suspect or organization. With so many groups and so many incidents to figure out there have been and remains a lot of finger pointing. Looking at the patterns, heads are also pointing as people are looking at China. I find it humorous to mention this, but even Google Trends has some interesting data that ultimately points at China, not that Google might be biased or anything….
All in all, it is complete lunacy to say the first allegations against the Chinese were those made in regards to Titan Rain, in 2005. Roger A. Grimes is an egoist and an imposter. To say it another way, to another crowd, Roger A. Grimes is a hack. InfoWorld, though never a big source of mine for information, does have a reputation, and with the junk coming out of Roger, InfoWorld is quickly losing my respect.
I wonder what we could pull up if we played with the word “hack” and toss in phreaking exploits, then scour around for stories from history…
